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I. INTRODUCTION

Political life is sometimes tragic.' As a conservative instrument for
safeguarding the government's obligation and ability to control the
governed (which, as Madison reminds us, is a prerequisite for the exercise
of self-control on the part of the government),2 and for preserving tolerable
political and social order, our constitutional framework recognizes the
necessity of exercising sovereign power to define and enforce criminal and
penal laws against its citizens, sometimes in aggressive and seemingly
harsh ways.3 On occasion, this means that the state will determine, based
on the lived experiences and moral sentiment of the community as
expressed by its political institutions, that some wrongdoers should be
* Capital Case Unit, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. Visiting
Assistant Professor, Stetson University College of Law (2005); Associate Professor, Texas
Wesleyan University School of Law (2003-2005). The views expressed here are mine and do not
necessarily represent the views or policies of the Department of Justice or any other governmental
entity. I am grateful to Wendy Lamond-Broughton, lawyer and actress, for her support.
1. I am indebted to my academic mentors for reminding me of this reality and its
importance. See DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WLLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.:
THE LAW AND POLITICS OF "LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY" 166 (1997).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3. See THEFEDERALISTNO. 49, at 317 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating
that public passions "ought to be controlled and regulated by the government").
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punished with death. No aspect of modem penal law is subjected to more
efforts to influence public attitudes or to more intense litigation than the
death penalty. The inquiries (they are distinct) concerning the
constitutional propriety and political wisdom of capital punishment, then,
reflect substantially our acknowledgment that who and how we punish are
defining characteristics of the political community.4
The contemporary discourse on capital punishment, however, also
offers important commentary on the broader-and dangerous-modem
impulse to satisfy public appetites and relieve the citizenry of the pains of
life in a democratic republic, an impulse that has become all too prevalent
in the contemporary American legal and political mind.5 The impulse has
its roots, of course, in the modem concern for rights6-a concern which,
when validated, necessarily constrains official power.' Such constraints are
not necessarily undesirable. But when the vindication of rights implicates,
indeed contravenes, the community's sovereign power to express tolerably
a moral sentiment about defining and punishing crime, particularly when
courts do so in the name of an abstract and perfected version of "liberty"
that seeks to maximize human dignity through autonomous individualism
and minimize reasoned restraints to control the people, these actions have
unique potential to intolerably undermine the government's ability to
control the people and compromise the prescribed roles of political
institutions in the constitutional structure.' In related ways, this impulse
also is rooted in modem government's continuing obsession with placating
the factious spirit and passions of an increasingly demanding public, an
obsession that would have been troubling to members of the Founding
generation who devised a constitutional system that consciously places
some distance between the government and the governed.9 Formal
institutional arrangements-the institutions and the "auxiliary precautions"
that anchor them-are therefore critical to preserving proper equilibrium
in the day-to-day exercise of self-government of and by human beings

4. See William J. Stuntz, The CourtandLaw Enforcement: PolicePowers, NEW REPUBLIC,
July 25, 2005, at 20 (stating that "[c]ivilizations define themselves by when, how, and whom they
punish").
5. See ROGERM.BARRUSETAL.,THEDEcONSTITUTIONALIZATIONOFAMERCA 153(2004).
6. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OFGOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967). For
excellent academic coverage of the constitutional and political claims of rights and the
consequences of those claims, compare MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) with RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (6th prtg. 1979).
7. See MARION, supra note 1, at 166.
8. For an excellent discussion of this concept in the context of Justice Brennan's thought
and writing, see id. at 159-67.
9. Harvey Mansfield referred to this distance as "constitutional space." See HARVEY C.
MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 16 (1991).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/3
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rather than angels, guided by the power of reason."l
For now, however, capital punishment in America is withering towards
its death-slowly, gradually, and incrementally-but surely nonetheless.
Particularly in light of the many newsworthy events that marked capital
punishment law and practice during 2005, which was an important year in
the life of the death penalty, much has been written recently about this
trend." This commentary, however, consistently overlooks the complex
institutional consequences of the primary factors affecting the death
penalty's demise. Although crime statistics, public concerns about actual
innocence, and legislatively-adopted sentencing alternatives are cited as
factors,12 two other simultaneous developments deserve special focus as
noteworthy contributors: a mass media-television, film, news
organizations, and the Internet-that possesses enormous potential to
influence and shape public attitudes and perception of capital

10. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 317, No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
11. See Dustin Arand, Death Penalty FoesLookfor Support in '06, MISSOURIAN NEWS, Jan.
11, 2006; Al Knight, Column, Death Penalty Under Fire, DENVER POST, Dec. 7, 2005, at B7;
Charles Lane, Column, Changing Attitudes About the Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2006,
at All; Peter Loge, Op-Ed., The Death Penalty Has Lost Its Power, HILL, Dec. 2, 2005, at 19;
Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Will Execution Move the Debate?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 2005, at
Cl; Robert Tharp, Is Death Penalty Losing Capital?,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 30, 2005, at
IA; Editorial, Death Penalty: Time to Rethink?, DAILY HERALD, Dec. 2,2005, at A6; Editorial, The
Year in Death,WASH. POST, Dec. 31,2005, at A18; Douglas A. Berman, Death Sentences Continue
to Decline, Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, Dec. 22, 2005, http://sentencing.typepad.con/
sentencing-law-and-policy/2005/12deathsentences.html; Jane Roh, Death Penalty Concerns
Don't Translate on PoliticalStage, FOXNEWS.COM, Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,178757,00.html.
12. See, e.g., Lane, supra note 11, at All (citing a drop in the number of homicides
nationwide and public concern about the potential innocence of the accused as reasons for changing
attitudes toward capital punishment); Tharp, supra note 11, at 1A (discussing public concern over
actual innocence and sentencing alternatives to the death penalty); Henry Weinstein, Death
Sentences Show Decline Nationwide, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at A26 (quoting the spokesman
for the National District Attorneys Association on death penalty issues Joshua Marquis, who stated
that executions are down "because of the overall decrease in violent crime around the country");
Roh, supra note 11 (discussing the "[n]ational awareness of the risk of wrongful capital
convictions").
Joshua Marquis, the District Attorney in Astoria, Oregon, and Ward Campbell, the Supervising
Deputy Attorney General for the State of California, offer compelling critiques of the actual
innocence concern. See, e.g., Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 501, 505 (2005) (describing the abolitionist proposition that "a remarkable number
of people on death row are innocent" as an "urban legend[f"); Ward A. Campbell, The Truth About
Actual Innocence: Critique of DPIC List, Remarks at the Association of Government Attorneys in
Capital Litigation Annual Conference (July 25,2002) (demonstrating that most of the inmates listed
by the Death Penalty Information Center as innocents are not "actually innocent" as that concept
is properly understood).
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punishment; 3 and a legal regime that, with the blessing and generous
assistance of the United States Supreme Court, has defined political
opposition to capital punishment as a proper subject for constitutional
litigation, which is increasingly successful. 4 Both, in their own ways, can
affect the integrity of the institutional arrangements of our constitutional
republic, though as a contributor to the demise of capital punishment, the
former is more attenuated; the latter is the more deeply troubling.
Indeed, the federal judiciary, and the Supreme Court specifically, is not
merely a participant in the demise of capital punishment it is a driving
force, without which much of the progress of contemporary abolitionists
would be more significantly constrained. We have seen its likeness in the
past, when in 1972, Furman v. Georgiat5 first killed capital punishment,
albeit temporarily, in the modem era by invalidating existing laws and
requiring entirely new systems of "guided discretion" in imposing the
death penalty. 16 The Furman-era dismantling was sudden and wholesale,
not incremental, as the dismantling is occurring today. Indeed, perhaps it
is the complex post-Furman"process" regime that has made contemporary
abolition so cumbersome and slow. Although the Rehnquist Court, in
particular, revived a sense of deference to political action that respected
the criminal justice system's interest in comity, finality, and federalism,17
the Court never quite overcame its post-Furman compulsion for
specialized rule-making in death penalty cases. The Court, rather,
continued employing its confusing, confused, and ultimately unprincipled
"death is different" rationale for intervention, which in recent years has
culminated in an unprecedented (and, frankly, arrogant) description of the
Court's role in capital litigation. 8 Atkins v. Virginia,19 which recognized

13. See J. Richard Broughton, Every Day More Wicked: Reflections on Culture,Politics,and
Punishment by Death, 22 J.L. & POL (forthcoming 2006).
14. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Abolition in Our Time, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
323, 340 (2003).
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
16. Id. at 239-58 (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding that unguided discretion in imposing the
death penalty resulted in the death penalty's application in a discriminatory manner); see also
Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment?:Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SuP. CT. REV. 1
(analyzing Furman).
17. See J. Richard Broughton, HabeasCorpusand the Safeguardsof Federalism,2 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 109, 134-54 (2004) (detailing the Rehnquist Court's protection for state law
enforcement interests in the habeas arena).
18. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (announcing that the
Constitution contemplates that the Court's own independent "judgment" governs in determining
the propriety of capital sentencing practices); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994
(1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining, in a non-capital case, how "death is different"); Alex
Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1,
29 (1995) (suggesting that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence "will continue to give
opponents a legitimate platform from which to impede even the most determined efforts to carry

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/3
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a categorical exemption from capital punishment for the mentally
retarded,20 and Roper v. Simmons,2 ' which recognized a categorical
exemption for those who commit their offense while under the age of
eighteen,22 are leading recent examples, though by no means the only ones
in the categorical exemption area.2 3 They are also examples of the modem
incrementalist strategy for killing capital punishment: As per se challenges
to capital punishment are unlikely to succeed, death penalty opponents
today instead target narrow and discrete death penalty practices primarily
through litigation, creating seemingly small but significant court victories
that, over time, slowly erode the scope and availability of death
sentencing. Thus, the Court's understanding and enforcement of its largely
uncircumscribed role in restricting the government's ability to employ
capital punishment, and in interfering with fair and reasonably conducted
capital litigation proceedings, may be welcome news for death penalty
opponents. Indeed, notwithstanding public misunderstanding about the
proper role of the Court, public respect for the Court's pronouncements is
quite high, and thus the Court has awesome potential to influence public
perception, opinion, and action (or inaction) on this subject and others.2 4
But this judicial phenomenon-what the authors of the
Deconstitutionalizationof America have aptly termed the "judicialization
of American life" 25-has only weakened the Court's legitimacy as an
independent voice for the rule of law and has undermined the vitality both
of political institutions and of responsible self-government in America.
Whether a decent and just society should punish wrongdoers with death
is, like political life itself, complicated. Even those of us (in my case,
retributivists) who think that it should (indeed, that in some circumstances,
it must, in order to remain decent and just), are compelled to acknowledge
the concerns that animate the opposition on that question. This Essay,
though, does not rehash the arguments concerning the political wisdom

out the death penalty on a routine basis").
19. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
20. Id. at 321.
21. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
22. Id. at 578-79.
23. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits a death sentence for offenders aged fifteen or younger); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of
the insane); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not
permit the imposition of capital punishment for one who does not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to
kill); Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (invalidating a Georgia law authorizing capital punishment for the
rape of an adult woman).
24. Cf.ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TowARDs GOMORRAH 96 (1996) (arguing that the
Court is the most powerful shaping force in American culture).
25. See BARRus ET AL, supra note 5, at 121.
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and expediency of capital punishment. Rather, as a constitutionalist
critique, this Essay explains that there is great danger to constitutional and
republican government when those arguments, and public opinion and
public sentiment associated with them, become the foundation for judicial
action.
Accordingly, I seek here to reexamine, indeed to reformulate, the
national discourse on capital punishment by urging greater consideration
of the consequences for form-the forms of the Constitution and its
institutional arrangements-that attend contemporary death penalty
jurisprudence. This Essay identifies capital litigation as a factor
significantly affecting the vitality of capital punishment in modem
America, and one in which arguments about the wisdom and desirability
of death penalty practices find expression in requests for judicial relief.
This Essay thus offers a normative critique of two significant strands of
recent Supreme Court death penalty cases. Primarily, it examines those
recent cases involving categorical exclusions from capital
punishment-Atkins and Roper-both of which have simultaneously
distorted the objective national consensus standard and rendered it
irrelevant in light of the Court's intolerably immodest understanding of its
own authority under the Eighth Amendment. Secondarily, this Essay
examines those cases involving reliance on federal collateral litigation to
restrict imposition of capital punishment, cases that appear to soften the
traditionally rigorous standards for collateral relief. These actions are
helping to incrementally erode capital punishment, though in a manner
distinct from the Furman-eradismantling. More importantly, I argue that
omnipotent and omniscient judicial regulation of capital sentencing
endangers the political institutions responsible for controlling the people
in our constitutional system. By serving as a forum for determining which
criminal punishments are morally right and desirable, and by
compromising the integrity of legal structures that safeguard vital state law
enforcement interests, the Court diminishes the essential distance that the
Constitution places between the government and the governed, and
between the institutions that govern. It also undermines the authority of the
political branches as the primary institutional media for filtering out public
passions and building coalitions for responsible democratic action to
control the people. Consequently, this Essay concludes that essentially
political arguments are now-more than ever before-dominating both the
Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence and constitutional
litigation involving the death penalty in ways that threaten the Court and
constitutional democracy.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/3
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II. JUDICIAL OMNIPOTENCE, OMNISCIENCE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY

Although numerous factors are driving the demise of capital
punishment in America, perhaps the most troubling feature of the modem
capital punishment dialogue is the omnipotent and omniscient role that the
Supreme Court has arrogated to itself. 26 In its capital jurisprudence, the
Court today appears to assume, and subsequently announces, that it knows
what is good and desirable for the political community (omniscience) and
that it has the absolute power to so declare (omnipotence). It is this
circumstance, quite apart from the results of the Court's death penalty
cases, that is most disturbing for constitutionalists.
A. The CategoricalExemption Cases: National Consensus or
"Independent" Judgment?
Atkins and Roper are the most recent, and the primary, symbols of the
Court's self-claimed omnipotence in constitutional adjudication of capital
cases. In each case the Court reiterated its approach to Eighth Amendment
challenges regarding the propriety of imposing capital punishment upon
a particular class of offenders, relying once again upon Trop v. Dulles's
contrivance that the Eighth Amendment forbids those practices that are
inconsistent with the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."" As applied in these two cases, the Trop
standard (itself unconnected to the text or relevant history of the Eighth
Amendment)28 was simply a rhetorical device for creating the illusion that
the Court was doing something other than acting politically.29 Ultimately,
though, the Court tipped its own hand: regardless of whether the objective
evidence of societal standards of decency favored or disfavored the
practice at issue, the Court frankly admitted that its "'own [independent]

26. In his fine critique of Roper, Judge Richard Posner states that the existence of some
constraints means that "the Court is not omnipotent; but no branch of government is." Richard A.
Posner, The Supreme Court,2004 Term, Foreword:A PoliticalCourt, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 42
(2005). I wholly agree that no branch of government really is omnipotent. Whether a particular
branch conducts itself that way, orfancies itself as such, however, is quite a different matter. So,
I argue, the Court is announcing itself as omnipotent, though it is not, for the reasons I discuss here.
27. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). For some historical context about the
insertion of this language into the opinion, see ED CRAY, CIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL
WARREN 358-59 (1997).
28. See Raoul Berger, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, in THE BILLOFRGHTS:
ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 303-08 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed. 1991).
29. See Benjamin Wittes, What is "Cruel and Unusual?," 134 POL'YREV. 15,19 (2005) ("It
is in [Trop's] language ... that the invitation for judicial subjectivity lies."); see also Charles
Hobson, Atkins v. Virginia, Federalism,and JudicialReview, 11 WIDENER L. REv. 23, 39 (2004)
(explaining how Atkins exposes the unprincipled nature of "Trop's evolving standards of decency
test").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

7

FLORIDA
Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAW
58,REVIEW
Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 3

[Vol. 58

judgment [would] be brought to bear on the question30of the acceptability
of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."
To determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel
and unusual (as understood by Trop's language), the Court invoked the
familiar national consensus standard, looking at the objective evidence of
societal standards of decency, legislative enactments and practices within
a state's criminal justice system. In recognizing a categorical exemption
from capital punishment for the mentally retarded, the Atkins Court
concluded that a national consensus had evolved against the practice.32 The
Court had rejected the same Eighth Amendment claim in 1989 in Penry v.
Lynaugh (Penry J),33 but recognized in Atkins that thirty states had
prohibited capital punishment for the mentally retarded. 34 This included
twelve states that did not impose capital punishment at all. 35 And of the
remaining states that maintained capital punishment for the mentally
retarded, the practice was infrequent.36 Therefore, although the Court could
not establish a meaningful numeric majority of jurisdictions that imposed
capital punishment but prohibited the practice of executing the mentally
retarded,37 the Court instead determined that what was 3significant was "the
consistency of the direction of change" after Penry J. 8
In Roper, which found an Eighth Amendment prohibition upon the
execution of those who commit their crimes under age eighteen, 39 the
evidence of a national consensus was even more tenuous,' and the Court
conceded as much.41 Still, although the Court had rejected this Eighth
Amendment claim also in 1989 in Stanford v. Kentucky,42 which provided
an intelligible articulation of the national consensus standard,43 the Roper
Court determined that the change from Stanford to Roper was, though not

30.
304, 312
31.
32.

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
(2002) (quoting, in turn, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977))).
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-17.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16.

33. 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
34. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15.
35. Id. at 314.
36. Id. at 316.
37. See id. at 342-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 315 (majority opinion).
39. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
40. See id. at 595 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 609-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 565-66 (majority opinion); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.18 (distinguishing
legislative reforms concerning the eligibility of offenders under the age of eighteen).
42. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). Stanford came a year after the Court reversed the conviction
of an Oklahoma defendant who was fifteen when he committed capital murder. See Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
43. Cf Stanford,492 U.S. at 369-77.
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"dramatic," nonetheless "significant."" Once again, despite the
acknowledged differences of the objective evidence in Atkins, the Court
concluded that "the same consistency of the direction of change has been
demonstrated. 45
The Court therefore created a new understanding of what constitutes
a national consensus against a particular death penalty practice. National
consensus now may be understood simply as a significant trend.' As
conceived in earlier cases and articulated in Stanford, the search for a
national consensus as a mechanism for enforcing the dictates of the Eighth
Amendment is intelligible and justifiable. 47 But a trend does not a
consensus make. And unlike other trends, there are in this area no
constitutionally permissible counter-trends. By constitutionalizing its
understanding of "cruel and unusual" in this way, the Court ensured that
even if a clear majority of states (indeed, even if all of them) desired to
adopt a system of capital punishment in which both the mentally retarded
and those who commit heinous crimes at age sixteen or seventeen would
be at least eligible for capital punishment and still permitted to introduce
evidence of their low intelligence or youth in mitigation, they could not do
so. The Court's new understanding of the national consensus standard (to
the extent that it can be called that) thus eviscerates any possibility of
further democratic action on these subjects within the political branches,
short of a federal constitutional amendment. Political action to combat and
punish crime, based upon the lived experiences of the political community
and subject to the institutional constraints placed upon political actors, is
impermissible in a regime where politics have been judicialized and the
Court's preferences constitutionalized.
But troubling though this development is, it is not the most troubling
aspect of the Atkins and Roper methodology. More troubling, rather, is the
Court's apparent understanding that the objective evidence of society's
moral judgments about criminal punishment is subordinate to the Court's
own moral (and hence, in this context, political) preferences.48 Focused on
the death penalty's "suitability" and "acceptability"-a curious way to
describe the interpretive function-once the Court dictates that "'in the
end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment," 4 9 the

44. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
45. Id. at 566.
46. See id. at 565-67.
47. Cf Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78.
48. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002).
49. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13 (quoting,
in turn, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977))). The Court plurality also used this language
in a footnote in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 n.8 (1988), invalidating an Oklahoma
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constitutional text and historical practice become irrelevant, and the
national consensus analysis becomes a useful rhetorical ruse for
rationalizing the Court's imposition of its own preferences. What is most
troubling is the Court's unembarrassed articulation of the principle; as
Atkins stated, "[g]uided by our approach in these cases, we shall first
review the judgment of legislatures that have addressed the suitability of
imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded and then consider
reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with their judgment."5' Such a
disturbingly clear statement of the Court's vision for its role in these cases
leaves little doubt about the soundness of Judge Richard Posner's
observation of Roper, that the Court "was doing what a legislature asked
to allow the execution of seventeen-year-old murderers would be doing:
making a political judgment."51 Quite apart from the desirability of the
Court's decisions and the institutional consequences of its methodology,
there is something unseemly about this kind of official immodesty. As
"[j]udicial modesty is not the order of the day
Judge Posner again notes,
52
Court."
Supreme
in the
As a consequence of the Court's troubled decision-making in this area,
Benjamin Wittes has recently referred to the Eighth Amendment as a
"jurisprudential train wreck" and has described the Court's Eighth
Amendment case law as marked by "rank subjectivity."53 Of course, the
Eighth Amendment is constitutionally unique to the extent that, unlike
other provisions of the Constitution, which ordinarily do not engage
abstract moral philosophizing but rather function as a practical charter of
governance for a large commercial republic,54 the term "cruel" inevitably
possesses moral content.55 But to assert that this fact alone empowers the
Court to enforce its understanding of which criminal justice policies are
most morally suitable or acceptable merely begs the question, and
certainly is no answer to the compelling critiques of Wittes and Judge
Posner. It is one thing to discern the consistency of a punishment practice
with historical judgments about-and social, political, and cultural
traditions enforcing a view of-what is moral. It is quite another to
judicialize, and thus decree normatively through constitutional

conviction for a defendant who committed the crime at age fifteen.
50. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
51. See Posner, supranote 26, at 47. Judge Posner's broader point is that this "is true of most
of the Court's constitutional decisions" because the Court usually acts as a political organ when
engaging in constitutional adjudication. Id.
52. Id. at 56.
53. Wittes, supra note 29, at 15, 17-20.
54. See ANTONIN SCAuA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 134 (Amy Gutmann, ed. 1997).

55. See id. at 146. For a new and provocative understanding of the Eighth Amendment, see
Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 119
(2004).
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adjudication, the political community's values about the proper
punishment of crime.
Indeed, the flimsiness of the Court's national consensus analysis in
Atkins and Roper, and of the authority for its ultimate decision in each
case, further evinces an essentially moral and, in this context, political (as
opposed to legal) judgment. A dialogue about the morality of imposing the
death penalty for the mentally retarded, or for those who commit their
crimes under age eighteen, is desirable and one that our society has had
even in the absence of the Supreme Court's moral stamp of approval. But
it is not an appropriate one for the judiciary, which is structured to (and
must, to function properly) retain the most distance from popular
sentiment and passion.56
The Court's methodology also reflects an incoherent approach to stare
decisis in constitutional adjudication.57 In well-known decisions like

56. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
57. The recent Supreme Court confirmation hearings for Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. and
Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. demonstrate that a judge's understanding of stare decisis carries political
significance. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 318-19 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals of the Third Circuit); ConfirmationHearingon the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.to
be ChiefJustice of the United States, HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
141-42 (2005) (statement of Hon. Arlen Specter, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary). Of
course, the Constitution says nothing about the role that precedent should play in adjudicating cases
and controversies. It is conceivable that, because of their experience with the common law, the
Framers contemplated that Article I judges would rely on precedent as part of the exercise of "the
judicial power," much as they contemplated that the unmentioned authority of judicial review
would be part of "the judicial power." See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). But the text does not provide any basis for believing that precedent
should play any special role in adjudication generally, and in fact gives us even less reason to
believe that it should play a special role in constitutionaladjudication. This is true even if we
assume that the text contemplates the power of judicial review.
Constitutional (and statutory) interpretation, which is based on a written document approved
by the people acting politically, is a much different process than that of common law judging,
which explicates legal norms based on the accumulated wisdom ofadjudicative tradition rather than
any written text. See SCALIA, supra note 54, at 37-41. Also, structurally the judiciary is placed
third among the branches and was designed with neither the power of the purse nor the sword; it
was, as Hamilton described it, designed as the least dangerous of the branches. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See generally Akhil
Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671 (2002) (explaining the importance of placement of
various provisions in the constitutional scheme). Because it was to be so, and because the text so
tightly circumscribes the judicial power and places such substantial distance between the judiciary
and the people, there is every reason to believe that the text contemplates a limited role for judicial
precedent that interprets the Constitution.
This is particularly true when we consider that Article V provides the sole mechanisms for
or convention.
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,58 which
reaffirmed the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade that the Due Process
Clause protects a substantive right to an abortion,5 9 and Dickerson v.

United States,' which held that Miranda v. Arizona announced a
constitutional rule that could not be altered by ordinary legislation,61 the
Court justified its adherence to precedent by discussing the reliance
interests associated with particular precedents.62 So how can it be that
Stanford commanded overruling in Roper? Or that Penry I commanded
overruling in Atkins?
Apparently, it matters not that most of the states that employed capital
punishment prior to Atkins and Roper, in ordering their penal law and
criminal justice systems, actually relied upon the previously-validated
option of imposing the death penalty for serious crimes where the offender
had the opportunity to offer evidence of his youth or low intelligence as a
mitigating factor. 63 This is not an endorsement, or a rejection, of the
Court's employment of stare decisis in Casey or Dickerson. Rather, it is
a normative observation that, to the extent stare decisis continues to
function as a desirable element of constitutional adjudication, the Court
should be intellectually honest in employing it. States have historically
ordered their criminal justice systems in reliance upon the availability of
capital punishment as a sentencing option in certain cases of profound
seriousness, even where the offender was under age eighteen or possessed
low intelligence.'M If the offense to state reliance interests was great in
Atkins and Roper (and it was), then the magnitude of the offense increases
every time the Court constitutionalizes a categorical exclusion to the death
penalty or otherwise imposes its own moral sensibilities to limit the ability

the structure and content of the constitutional text, precedents that change the Constitution-those
that expand constitutional protections for the individual or governmental limits beyond those that
are enumerated and fairly contained within the meaning of the text (as evident from structural and
historical considerations)-ought to command no particular deference.
58. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

59. Id. at 846.
60. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
61. Id. at 444.

62. Id. at 443.
63. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (holding that youth is a mitigating factor
"that must be within the effective reach of a capital sentencing jury"); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 327-28 (1989) (holding that mental retardation is a mitigating factor that must be considered
by a capital sentencing jury who can give it mitigating effect).
64. See, e.g., Guy Goldbert & Gena Bunn, Balancing Fairness and Finality: A
Comprehensive Review of the Texas Death Penalty, 5 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 49, 138-39 (2000)
(explaining how Texas reordered its capital sentencing law to allow consideration for mitigation
evidence after PenryI); Joseph E. Wilhelm & Kelly L. Culshaw, Ohio'sDeathPenalty Statute: The
Good, the Bad, andthe Ugly, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 549 (2002) (explaining that Ohio broadens the scope
of relevant mitigation evidence).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/3
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of the political community to tolerably employ capital punishment.
The Court justifies its departure from precedent by citing changed
societal and political conditions.65 But this reinforces the problem inherent
in the Court's approach. After all, if the Court means what it says that
changed conditions have now resulted in a national consensus against
executing the mentally retarded or offenders under age eighteen, then why
would the Court's "independent judgment" about those punishments
matter at all? Rather, under such reasoning, the judgments of the people,
viewed objectively, would matter most. And yet, the Court tells us that in
the end, it is the Court's own independent judgment that must be brought
to bear in determining the suitability or acceptability of the death
penalty.66 But if the Court means what it says in that regard, then why
would it matter whether there was a national consensus against a particular
practice? Again, these incompatible lines of reasoning demonstrate the
intellectual difficulty of an approach that appears to simply be made up by
the Court in the middle of the game. The "national consensus" aspect of
the Eighth Amendment test is rendered meaningless once the Court admits
that its own judgment will be brought to bear. This, in turn, suggests that
the Court uses the "national consensus" language to provide cover for
what it is really doing-substituting its own moral convictions for those
of the people acting politically. It also underscores the fragility of
arguments about stare decisis, which ironically offers no protection
for democratically adopted criminal punishments in a regime where the
judiciary's "independent judgment" is supreme.
B. The CapitalHabeas Cases:Never Mind the Statute, Death is
Different
Another strand of recent decisions that are helping to kill capital
punishment, though perhaps less directly and with greater subtlety, is the
Supreme Court's capital habeas cases. These cases differ from the
categorical exemption cases to the extent they do not involve questions
about the constitutionality of a particular death penalty practice. Rather,
they involve the procedural regularity of trials in which a conviction has
been obtained and capital punishment imposed.67 Most importantly, habeas
courts, in both capital and non-capital cases, are subject to a variety of
statutory and doctrinal constraints that are not present on direct review of

65. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-66 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
313-17 (2002).
66. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 563; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13.
67. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005) (reversing a capital conviction
because the defendant's counsel gave ineffective assistance).
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criminal judgments. 68 Despite these distinctions, however, a number of the
Court's recent capital habeas decisions suggest that the habeas remedy has
re-emerged as yet another mechanism limiting the government's ability to
employ capital punishment.69
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) 70 placed several important procedural reforms into the
previously existing habeas regime. 71 The most prominent of those reforms
was the provision, § 2254(d), that federal habeas relief be unavailable to
a state prisoner unless the prisoner demonstrates that the state court's
decision on the merits of his constitutional claim was "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or was "based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding. 72 During the debates about the
AEDPA in Congress, lawmakers hotly contested this provision. Supporters
saw this reform as a way of promoting comity between the state and
federal courts and assuring that federal judges did not have unrestrained
freedom to interfere with the state's administration of its own criminal
justice system; opponents feared that it would displace federal courts as
the chief arbiters of federal constitutional rights.73 The Court has since
stated that the state court deference provisions of § 2254(d) require a
showing that the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable, not
simply incorrect.74 In addition, under § 2254(e)(1), the AEDPA provides
68. See Broughton, supra note 17, at 117-54.
69. See infra notes 82-101 and accompanying text.
70. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214(1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,2253-2255,
2261-2266 (2000)).
71. For additional discussions of AEDPA (beyond my own), see Andrew Hammel,
Diabolical Federalism:A Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty
FederalHabeas,39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing habeas reform); Mark Tushnet & Larry
Yackle, Symbolic StatutesandReal Laws: The PathologiesoftheAntiterrorismandEffective Death
PenaltyAct and the PrisonLitigation Reform Act, 47 DuKEL.J. 1 (1997) (discussing the statutory
interpretion and constitutional issues raised by AEDPA); Larry W. Yackle, A Primeron the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996) (discussing the effect of AEDPA on federal
habeas adjudication).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2000).
73. Compare,e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7803-01, S7820-23 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Nickels), and id. at S7845-46 (statement of Sen. Hatch), with id. at S7815-17 (statement
of Sen. Feingold), andid. at S7808-09 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also Broughton, supranote
17, at 125-33 (discussing the legislative history of AEDPA); Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law:
Reasonable Unreasonableness,Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 535 (1999) (analyzing Section 2254's limitation on the judicial standard of review); Evan
Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d)of the New HabeasStatute: An (Opinionated)User'sManual, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 103, 112-15 (1998) (same); Yackle, supra note 71, at 438-43 (same).
74. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,27 (2002); (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362,411 (2000).
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that federal courts owe deference to state court fact-findings, absent clear
and convincing evidence to rebut those findings.75
In the five years since the Court first articulated its approach under the
AEDPA, in both capital and non-capital cases, the Court has given
substantial deference to state courts, consistent with the AEDPA' s scheme
and with the expressions of those who crafted the statute.76 Notably,
however, the Court has proven less deferential (though certainly not
undeferential) in capital habeas cases.7 7 Over the past five years, only
death-sentenced inmates have prevailed in challenging a state court's
decision as objectively unreasonable under § 2254(d).78 Interestingly, three
of those cases involved ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 79 which
are ordinarily among the most difficult to prove on collateral review, given
the combination of the AEDPA's deference scheme8° and the high
threshold for relief established in Strickland v. Washington's requirement
that such challenges demonstrate both deficient performance and actual
prejudice.8 '
In Rompilla v. Beard82 and Wiggins v. Smithy the Court softened its
application of the prejudice prong, and found objectively unreasonable two
state court decisions that had rejected the claims of death row inmates that
they had constitutionally ineffective punishment-phase counsel." In
(Terry) Williams v. Taylor,85 the case that gave the Court its first
opportunity to articulate its approach to AEDPA deference under
§ 2254(d), the Court determined, as in Rompilla and Wiggins, that the state
court acted unreasonably in rejecting Williams' ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.86 In Miller-El v. Dretke,87 the Court held that the state court
acted unreasonably in rebuffing Thomas Joe Miller-El's Batson claim. 88
In Penry v. Johnson (Penry I/),89 the Court held that the state courts once
again misapplied relevant Eighth Amendment doctrine when they upheld
a "nullification instruction" that failed to give jurors an adequate vehicle
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000).
76. See Broughton, supra note 17, at 133.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 66-76.
78. See infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2000).
81. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
82. 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005).
83. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
84. Rompilla, 125 S. Ct. at 2467; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534.
85. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
86. Id. at 397-98.
87. 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
88. Id. at 2340; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids use of peremptory challenges based on race of prospective juror).
89. 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
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for giving mitigating effect to Penry' s alleged mental retardation.9 ° Finally,
though not a case involving deference under § 2254(d) or (e), the Court
ruled unanimously in (Michael Wayne) Williams v. Taylor9 ' that a death
row inmate was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on two constitutional
claims, even under the AEDPA's strict requirements.92
The Court also has ruled against the government, and in favor in the
death row inmate, in several recent capital habeas cases from Texas that
did not all involve AEDPA deference, but that signaled a budding
doctrinal feud with the Fifth Circuit in the capital habeas arena. 93 In
Tennard v. Dretke, 4 for example, the Court continued its ongoing capital
habeas feud with the Fifth Circuit by holding that the lower court
improperly denied Tennard a certificate of appealability (COA) on his
claim that he was entitled to a mitigation instruction regarding his alleged
low intelligence.95 The Court also took the opportunity to rebuke the Fifth
Circuit for misconstruing the prerequisites for a Penry instruction.96
97
Tennardfollowed the original Miller-El decision, Miller-El v. Cockrell,
which held that Miller-El was entitled to a COA on his Batson claim.98
There the Court used especially strong language (which foreshadowed its
eventual decision in Miller-El 11)99 to question the jury selection practices
of the Dallas County District Attorney's Office and to rebuff the Fifth
Circuit for being too dismissive of Miller-El's claim. " Finally, in the nonAEDPA case of Banks v. Dretke,1' the Court again reversed the Fifth
lower court had wrongly adjudicated Delma
Circuit, holding that 10the
2
Banks's Brady claim.
With these numerous victories for capital defendants, one might expect
some record of success for non-capital inmates. After all, they, too, may
raise ineffective assistance claims, Brady claims, due process claims,
claims about the improper denial of a COA, and so on. Yet, over the past
five Terms in non-capital cases where AEDPA deference was at issue

90. Id. at 798, 803-04.
91. 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
92. Id. at 436-37; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000).
93. See Allen Pusey, Taking the Fifth to Task, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 25, 2004, at IH
(discussing the the Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the Fifth Circuit's decisions in capital
habeas cases).

94. 542 U.S. 274 (2004).
95. Id. at 288-89.
96. Id. at 283-88.
97. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
98. Id. at 348.
99. 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
100. Miller-Ell,at 331-35.
101. 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
102. Id. at 705-06.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/3
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(Middleton v. McNeil,' °3 Yarborough v. Alvarado,"° Yarborough v.
Gentry, 5 Hollandv. Jackson,l0 6 Lockyer v. Andrade,10 7 Pricev. Vincent, 0 8
and Early v. Packer'°9), the Court sided with the government in finding
that the state court decisions were not objectively unreasonable. 0 Indeed,
the Court has sided with the government in almost every non-capital
habeas case in which a decision was rendered on the merits of the granted
issue. 1 1 Only in Dye v. Hofbauer, 12 which did not involve AEDPA
deference but rather found that the prisoner had fairly presented his
constitutional claim in the state courts and could therefore have it
considered on federal habeas review,11 3 and Lee v. Kemna, 114 which did not
involve the deference scheme of §§ 2254(d) or (e) or any other basis for
substantive habeas relief, but ruled that a state rule of procedure did not
it had
constitute an adequate and independent state law ground because
15
prevail.1
inmate
non-capital
a
did
applied,
"exorbitantly"
been
Of course, it is important not to overstate the point. Whether on the
merits pursuant to § 2254(d) or pursuant to one of the doctrinal rules that
reinforce the traditional narrowness of the habeas remedy-the nonretroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane,' 16 the exhaustion and procedural
default doctrines, 17 or the harmless error doctrine,118 which is far more
friendly to the government on collateral review than on direct review-the
Court often has rejected the constitutional claims of capital defendants on
federal habeas review in recent Terms.' 1 9
103. 541 U.S. 433, 437-38 (2004) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 542 U.S. 946 (2004).
104. 541 U.S. 652,668-69 (2004) (holding that the California court was reasonable in finding
a non-custodial interrogation).
105. 540 U.S. 1, 5-7 (2003).
106. 542 U.S. 649, 652-54 (2004).
107. 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).
108. 538 U.S. 634, 643 (2003).
109. 537 U.S. 3, 10-11 (2002).
110. See supra notes 103-09.
111. See, e.g., Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846, 853-54 (2006); Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct.
2562,2574-75 (2005); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2005); Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S.
225,231-34 (2004); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386,393-96 (2004); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27,
30-34 (2004); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,661-68 (2001); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).
112. 126 S. Ct. 5 (2005).
113. Id. at 6-7.
114. 534 U.S. 362 (2002).
115. Id. at 376, 387-88.
116. 489 U.S. 288, 300-17 (1989).
117. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,729-32,750 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 81-91 (1977).
118. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630-38 (1993).
119. See, e.g., Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884, 894 (2006) (pre-AEDPA case); Bradshaw
v. Richey, 126 S. Ct. 602, 605 (2005); Bell v. Thompson, 125 S. Ct. 2825, 2836-37 (2005);
Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2090-92 (2005); Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438-42
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But it also is important not to underestimate the significance of the
trend even in the deferential AEDPA regime in recent Terms, which
suggests that the Court is giving greater scrutiny, even on collateral
review, to state court decisions on a variety of procedural claims
(ineffective assistance claims, Batson claims, Brady claims, etc.) in cases
where capital punishment has been imposed and is substantially more
likely to grant certiorari in such a case and to grant relief. The trend
implies that the Court has imported the pernicious "death is different"
rationale into the habeas statute. This is unremarkable, given the legacy of
the "death is different" rationale and the Court's continued insistence that
courts give extra care to cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed. But however unremarkable it is, it remains undesirable.
First, the plain language of the habeas statute's governing provisions
makes no distinction between the scope and kind of review to be employed
in a capital case and a non-capital case. 120 Moreover, the Court's habeas
jurisprudence has, for the past two decades, properly accounted for the
differences between direct and collateral review, recognizing the unique
place of state courts in the adjudication of constitutional claims and the
burdens that collateral review imposes upon the government's ability to
define and enforce its criminal law and bring its criminal judgments to
finality. 121 The tri-pillars of comity, finality, and federalism have defined

(2005); Bell v. Cone, 125 S. Ct. 847, 855-56 (2005); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406,420 (2004);
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18-19 (2003);
Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202,210 (2003); Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266,271-72 (2002); Bell
v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-703 (2002); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173-76 (2002).
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), (e) (2000). But see Dwight Aarons, Reflections on the Killing
State: A CulturalStudy of the Death Penalty in the Twentieth Century United States?,70 TENN. L.
REv. 391, 428 (2003) (stating that the AEDPA is remarkable because it distinguishes between
capital and non-capital cases). Professor Aarons is referring to the provisions of the statute that
provide "fast-track" procedures for considering capital habeas cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2265
(2000). Those provisions, however, apply only in qualifying jurisdictions, of which there are
currently none. The primary and governing provisions of AEDPA do not distinguish capital and
non-capital cases.
121. See, e.g., (Michael Wayne) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (stating that
"we have been careful to limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and
to safeguard the States' interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings");
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554 (1998) (recognizing "'the profound societal costs that
attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction"' (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986)));
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 726,738-39 (explaining that "[t]his is a case about federalism" and that when
state prisoners bring claims on federal habeas review "it is the State that must respond. It is the
State that pays the price in terms of the uncertainty and delay added to the enforcement of its
criminal laws"); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (explaining that habeas cases implicate
finality, and "[w]ithout finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect"); Engle
v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (stating that "[flederal intrusions into state criminal trials
frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor
constitutional
rights").
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habeas law and jurisprudence since the mid- 1970s. 122 But by incorporating
the "death is different" contrivance into its habeas jurisprudence, and,
worse yet, into the text of the AEDPA, the Court further contributes to the
demise of the death penalty by enhancing the burdens already imposed
upon state capital litigators and state courts. Comity, finality, and
federalism thus face an obstacle to realization-heightened scrutiny-that
they do not face in non-capital habeas cases. As a result, in this narrow
context, the Court is coming dangerously close to returning to the Warren
Court's misguided project of using habeas as a mechanism for explicating
constitutional and procedural norms, at least for capital cases, and thus
again inflating its own function in the machinery of criminal justice. 23
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL OMNIPOTENCE
AND OMNISCIENCE IN DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE

Our constitutional design contemplates institutions with distance, to
ensure the safe and competent control of imperfect human beings by other
imperfect human beings. 24 There is distance between those who govern
and those who are governed. And there is space between the institutions
that do the governing. Indeed, the key structural characteristics of the
Constitution's institutional design-the "auxiliary precautions" of
separated and subdivided powers (including a legislative branch
subdivided into two distinct chambers with differing responsibilities and
characteristics, and an executive with power to veto legislation to protect
institutional prerogatives and individual liberty), and the oft-forgotten
auxiliary precaution of federalism-provide both formal and literal space
between institutions.'25 The Court's contemporary capital punishment
jurisprudence compromises both aspects of constitutional distance, and,
consequently, the strength of the governmental institutions themselves.
Thus, it is critical to consider the institutional and structural consequences

I have elsewhere discussed these important limitations on collateral review. See J. Richard
Broughton, Off the Rails on a Crazy Train?: The StructuralConsequencesof Atkins andModem
Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 11 WIDENER L. REv. 1, 13-15 (2004).
122. See Broughton, supranote 17, at 133-54; see also Woodford, 538 U.S. at 206 (stating that
"Congress enacted AEDPA... 'to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism'
(quoting (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000))).
123. See John J. Dinan, The Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions in Perspective, 15 J.L.
& POL. 127, 153-54 (1999) (explaining that the Warren Court's habeas decisions "expanded
significantly the opportunities for petitioners to seek review of state court judgments"); Patrick E.
Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433,2437-38 (1993) (explaining the breadth
of the Warren Court's habeas theory); Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal
Procedure,73 U. COLO.L. REv. 1337, 1344-45 (2002) (describing the "broad, remedial Vision of
habeas corpus" in the Warren Court).
124. See MANSFIELD, supra note 9, at 16.
125. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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of the Court's all-knowing and all-powerful death penalty case law, and,
in so doing, to avoid the error of viewing the Court's death penalty cases
solely in the context of, and as significant only for, our concern for
individual rights.
The categorical exemption decisions like Atkins and Roper, in
particular, and to a lesser extent the recent capital habeas cases that I have
mentioned here, undermine the Court's institutional independence from
the political branches, and thus compromise the effectiveness of the
auxiliary precaution of separated and subdivided powers. To refine and
enlarge the public view, to filter and moderate public passion and factious
spirit, the Constitution orders political decision-making through the formal
arrangements of representation and administration, though not judicial
review. 26 This formality obtains not simply from the absence of judicial
review from the constitutional text (though I accept that "the judicial
power" contemplates a form of judicial review), but from several textual,
structural, and historical considerations: the textual limits on judicial
authority (to hear only "cases" and "controversies"), 2 7 and from the
Convention debates and the Convention's rejection of the Council of
Revision,1 28 including Madison's persuasive proposal at the Convention
that the courts shall be limited to hearing cases of a "judiciary nature."129
Yet, the Court is an institution no longer fond of the proposition that
something is for someone else to decide. Consequently, these cases are
part of a larger body of precedent that has led many Americans to view the
Court as just another political decision-maker. 3 As Professor Barrus and
his colleagues rightly observe, "the conviction that judicial officials are
also political actors can have undesirable effects on the behavior of
citizens."3' In particular, these recent capital cases aid in producing a
citizenry that becomes accustomed to seeking policy changes through
judicial action, rather than by forming political coalitions and persuading
traditionally political institutions to engage in difficult and complex policy
debates and subsequently to be held accountable for their decisions. As a
consequence, responsible citizenship and self-government-manifest in
elections for determining political representation and in coalitional
politics-are transformed into a litigation culture that habitually seeks out
126. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80-81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
127. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
128. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-21, 97-98, 104, 10809, 140 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966); see also James T. Barry III, The Councilof Revision and
the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CI. L. REv. 235 (1989) (discussing the Convention's
consideration and rejection of the proposed Council of Revision).
129. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 128, at 430.
130. See BARRUS ET AL., supra note 5, at 112; ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OFAMERICA

2 (1990); MARION, supra note 1, at vii.
131. BARRUSETAL.,supra note 5, at 112.
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the judiciary to avoid the pains and tragedies of political life, such as the
aggressive enforcement of criminal and penal laws that impose severe
punishments for serious offenses against the public.' 32 "Why even worry
about building coalitions to influence electoral outcomes or legislative
policy making," the Deconstitutionalizationauthors ask, "if the courts are
available to provide immediate protection for preferred interests and/or
relief against unwanted governmental actions?"'' 33 It is an important
rhetorical question, one that demonstrates the collateral consequences of
pursuing a judiciary that practices a kind of death penalty imperialism.
This is not to say that death penalty opponents have made the judiciary
their exclusive theater of battle."'34 Legislative reforms are advocated, and
some limited success therein has been achieved.135 But even prominent and
thoughtful abolitionists Carol and Jordan Steiker acknowledge that
constitutional adjudication is the preferred route for abolition.' 36
Consequently, this approach diminishes the distance between the Court
and the people by conveying the impression to citizens that judges can act
on their behalf to decide important policy questions. This is a special
problem under the capital punishment regime endorsed in Atkins and
Roper, leading examples of how "[t]he judgment of the judges trumps the

132. See id. at 122.
133. Id. at 121.
134. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative
"Reform" of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 418-21 (2002) (suggesting that death
penalty opponents are directing their attention at executive and legislative reform rather than
judicial).
135. See id. at 418 (discussing states' legislative reform); see also Franklin E. Zimring, The
Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform of the Model Penal Code, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1396, 1412 (2005) (urging the American Law Institute to endorse abolition of the
death penalty); Angela Delli Santi, Death Penalty: Legislators Back Suspension, Study, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 2006, at B I (stating that New Jersey lawmakers passed a death penalty
moratorium, pending the outcome of a study, which they expect the governor to sign); Peter Slevin,
More in U.S. Expressing Doubts About Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at Al
(discussing new state legislation on capital punishment); Weinstein, supra note 12, at A26 (noting
that Illinois continued its death penalty moratorium for a sixth year and that the New Jersey Senate
passed legislation to suspend executions until the state's death penalty system can be studied by a
commission); Editorial, Embracing a Culture of Life, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005, at 8
(advocating the abolition of the death penalty and discussing potential legislative reforms in
Alabama).
136. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 14, at 340. Professors Steiker and Steiker state that,
because legislative reform is limited by considerations of federalism and political populism, "the
route to nation-wide abolition in the United States is almost certainly through constitutional
litigation in the courts rather than through state-by-state legislative abolition." Id. Of course, this
also is because, in their view, some legislative reforms could potentially legitimate and entrench
capital punishment. See Steiker & Steiker, supranote 134, at 422-24; cf Carol S. Steiker, Capital
Punishmentand American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REV. 97 (2002) (discussing why political
abolition in the United States is less likely when compared to western Europe).
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reasoning of all other persons since the courts are assumed to be entrusted
with the final determination of what is acceptable in all significant matters
' This, in turn, diminishes the
that affect the way of life of the people."137
constitutional distance between the judicial and the policy-making
institutions. In such a regime, the Court cannot credibly maintain its status
as a politically independent protector of the rule of law in a government of
limited and enumerated powers. Furthermore, the legislative and executive
branches cannot meaningfully fulfill their constitutional roles as the
138
institutional mediums for filtering out and moderating public passions.
Consequently, auxiliary precautions for ensuring safe and competent
government prove to be merely illusory.
In addition, the importation of enhanced judicial scrutiny for capital
habeas cases under the AEDPA undermines the auxiliary precaution of
federalism, and dangerously minimizes the federal government's distance
from the states. Forget the crude notion of federalism as "states' rights"
(whatever that means), mere deference to states, or mere decentralization
for its own sake. A fuller, and more sophisticated, account recognizes that
a robust federalism seeks a tolerable equilibrium between federal and state
power; it provides, as Harvey Mansfield describes it, constitutional
dimension for literal space, and offers a critical arrangement for
structuring rational deliberation in the exercise139of responsible selfgovernment and for safeguarding political liberty.
True, as do the capital habeas cases, the direct review cases like Atkins
and Roper have the effect of interfering with the state's sovereign power
to make and enforce its own criminal and penal law. But, as the Court
itself recognized during the height of its judicially-enforced protection for
state criminal law enforcement interests, habeas cases are "about
federalism '"'

because "'profound societal costs.., attend the exercise of

habeas jurisdiction' and thus the offense to the states is dramatically
enhanced on federal collateral review.' 41 Again, nothing in the statutory

137. BARRUS ET AL., supra note 5, at 122-23.
138. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(explaining how representation should "refine and enlarge" the public view); John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Our SupermajoritarianConstitution,80 TEx. L. REV. 703, 773-74 (2002)
(explaining how the executive veto serves as a legislative filter).
139. See MANSFIELD, supra note 9, at 16; see also SAMUEL H. BEER, TOMAKEANATION: THE
REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 279-301 (1993) (discussing federalism as one of
Madison's "auxiliary precautions").
140. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991).
141. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538,554-55 (1998) (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.
527,539 (1986)); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,436 (2000) ("[W]ehave been careful
to limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and to safeguard the States'
interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings."); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 726,
738-39 (explaining that "[tlhis is a case about federalism" and that when state prisoners bring
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scheme authorizes the Court's methodological innovation. Judicially
enhancing scrutiny of state death penalty decisions through the habeas
statute compromises the Court' s institutional character and diminishes the
constitutional distance not just between it and the political branches, but
between the federal and state judicial systems, contrary to much of what
the Court has otherwise told us about its understanding of the habeas
remedy.'42 This is especially troubling, not simply in the context of capital
punishment, but in the context of the Court's judicially-enforced
federalism more broadly. After Gonzales v. Raich,'43 which upheld
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the wholly
intrastate, noncommercial possession of marijuana for personal medicinal
use because such an activity was part of a class of activities that could
substantially affect interstate commerce, " as well as recent cases in the
areas of state sovereign immunity and federal preemption,' 45 the Rehnquist
Court's judicially-enforced federalism may have reached its outer limits,
at least in those areas. Habeas, however, has remained the last holdout of
the federalism revival (indeed, as I have argued previously, the habeas
cases were among the origins of the revival). 146 That fact will be less likely
to remain true if the Roberts Court follows the underlying normative
theory of those cases that use the habeas remedy specifically to articulate
legal norms that narrow the scope and availability of capital punishment,
while simultaneously depreciating vital state criminal law enforcement
interests and, consequently, the structural virtues of federalism and
claims on federal habeas review "it is the State that must respond. It is the State that pays the price
in terms of the uncertainty and delay added to the enforcement of its criminal laws"); McCleskey
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,492 (1991) ("[Ihf reexamination of convictions in the first round of habeas
offends federalism and comity, the offense increases when a State must defend its conviction in a
second or subsequent habeas proceeding on grounds not even raised in the first petition."); Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (explaining that habeas cases implicate finality, and "[w]ithout
finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect"); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
128 (1982) ("Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power
to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.").
142. See supra text accompanying note 139.
143. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
144. Id. at 2204-05, 2215.
145. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that Congress validly
abrogated state sovereign immunity through Title H of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Am.
Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that the President's power to conduct
foreign affairs preempted the California Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act); Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign
immunity through the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993). See generallyWilliam D. Araiza,
The Section 5 Power After Tennessee v. Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 39 (2004) (discussing the impact
of Lane upon the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence); Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier,7
TEx. REV. L. & POL. 93, 110-16 (2002) (explaining that the federal preemption cases have not
followed the Court's federalism theory in other areas).
146. See Broughton, supra note 17, at 161.
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institutional distance.
The Court's most recent capital cases therefore have not simply done
damage to the vitality of the death penalty. They have also damaged the
formal institutional arrangements of the Republic that are necessary to
preserve constitutional order and the government's ability to tolerably
control the governed.'47
IV.

CONCLUSION

Institutions, and the formalities that characterize their place in the
constitutional system, are only a part of the formula for a successful
American experiment. Good habits and mores of the people are also
critical aspects of responsible and competent self-government. Institutional
arrangements, however, have special significance when ordering and
administering a system for punishing violent crime. Criminal justice, more
than any other aspect of life in the political community, confirms
Madison's observation that humans are not angels and that, consequently,
the government must be able, and have adequate latitude, to control the
people. Judicial review, however, can serve as a unique mechanism for
limiting the government's authority to accomplish that purpose. Such is
the modern state of capital punishment law.
Thanks in substantial part to a judicial construct that allows the courts
to supplant political institutions as a forum for debating the desirability of
capital punishment practices, capital punishment opponents are now
gaining litigation victories by challenging discrete categories of capital
punishment practice and the legal procedures unique to death penalty
cases. Simultaneously there is growing anecdotal and empirical evidence
(though we should question its ultimate reliability and the methodology for
obtaining it) that the public is increasingly concerned about the potential
execution of the innocent, the quality of defense representation, and the
availability of alternative sentences (all legitimate concerns, though hardly
new ones). The litigation battle against capital punishment is today
incremental and increasingly successful. Thanks to the judicial
omnipotence and omniscience demonstrated by the Atkins and Roper
Courts, the phenomenon is likely to know few boundaries, as the current
debate about executing the mentally ill suggests. 48 None of this is to

147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
148. See generally Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental
illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003) (arguing that imposing capital punishment on those who are
mentally ill violates equal protection, particularly if it is unconstitutional to impose the death
penalty upon the mentally retarded and those under age eighteen); Ronald J. Tabak, Overview of
Task ForceProposalon Mental Disabilityandthe Death Penalty,54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1123 (2005)
(discussing an American Bar Association proposal advocating a categorical exemption from the
death penalty for persons with certain limits on their intellectual functioning and adaptive skills).
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suggest that courts should not be available to protect rights; of course, they
should be. But courts, no less than legislators and executives, are
institutionally constrained even as they seek to protect rights. It is those
structural concerns-concerns about the institutional role of the courts and
about the distance that it must preserve between itself and the political
institutions of a constitutional democracy-that animate my argument here
concerning the state of death penalty jurisprudence.
Thus, capital punishment, at least as a popular and widely available
sentencing option, is gradually dying. Bringing it back to life, to the extent
the political community finds that desirable, will require more than just a
commitment to improving capital practices and criminal justice
procedures, and more than just a shift in public attitude and perception. It
will require a commitment to restoring meaning to the formal institutional
arrangements of our constitutional framework. Even this may not
ultimately save capital punishment. It will, however, go a long way toward
preserving decent and competent constitutional government.
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